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Greetings from Local Organizing Committee (LOC)
It is the great honor as Chair of the Local Organizing Committee, I will be
delighted to welcome you to the 12th Indonesian regional
ciation (IRSA) conference from 2
of South Sulawesi Province, Indonesia and hosted by the Faculty of
Economics and Business, Hasanuddin University (FEB UNHAS).
The city of Makassar is the largest city i
Sulawesi, Makassar enjoys a central location in the Indonesian
archipelago. In fact,
known as a thriving sea port where merchant vessels from far away China, India and Cam
Meanwhile, in this southern peninsula of Sulawesi, the Bugis, Makassar and Mandar ethnic groups,
known for their seafaring prowess and boat building skills, had already developed powerful
kingdoms that encouraged trade, fishery, rice cultivation as
Bugis epic poem I la Galigo is a recognized masterpiece in Bugis literature, as are the graceful
dances and bright silk costumes of court dancers with their richly decorated accessories of wide
gold bangles. .
This conference in 2014 marks a new departure and perhaps a new future. For the first time it is
being held in Sulawesi, East Indonesia. Many of you have travelled far to attend this meeting, and
we hope you will feel your trouble has been rewarded. We have an ex
from all over the world from many of the world’s experts, embodying the consolidation of tested
ideas as well as the latest advances in the subject. These will be set in context by a glittering array
of keynote and invited speakers.
The conference is the event of the Indonesian section of the IRSA and will be a venue for regional
scientists and researchers of various different disciplines from countries and beyond to share
research findings and discuss current topics on the
conference theme is "Political Economy of Regional Development in Indonesia”. As one of the
biggest regional science conference in the world, the IRSA 12th Conference will be attended by
around 300 researchers and academicians from Indonesia and other countries who will share their
expertise and find out about the latest research on regional science and regional development
policies.
On behalf of the Local Programme Committee, I am glad to acknowledge the hard
members of the Local Organising Committee in putting the programme together and making all the
arrangements, and to accept their hospitality. It is my privilege and pleasure to welcome you all to
the 12th Indonesian Regional Science Association
for their sacrifice and contribution, especially the Steering Committees, and the Ministry
National Development Planning
I hope you have an excellent opportunity to exchange knowledge and to
friendships at the conference. Finally, I would like to thank all sponsors and exhibitors for your
support in making the 12th Conference of IRSA the landmark event it has become.
Best Wishes,
Dr. Abd Hamid Paddu
Chair of Local Organizing Committee
- 3 June, 2014 in Makassar, the capi
n east Indonesia. Capital of South
ever since the 14th century Makassar was already
well as literature and the arts. The
cellent selection of papers
regional aspects of various global issues. The
Conference here in Makassar. I thank all of them
/ BAPPENAS.
Science Asso-
tal
bodia.
work of the
of
make and renew
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Greetings from Faculty of Economics, University of Hasanuddin
It is my great pleasure to welcome you to the 12th Indonesian Regional Science Association
Conference. This event is proudly organized by Faculty of Economic Hasanuddin University and
Indonesian Regional Science Association (IRSA).
Economic Faculty is the oldest faculty in Hasanuddin University and strives to be one of the best
economic faculties in Indonesia and in the world. One of the efforts is by conducting this
International Conference. It is a great honor specifically for economic faculty and Hasanuddin
University, generally, to be trusted to hold such a great conference. We believe that this event will
give us the opportunity to increase our standing in the eye of international academia. For that, we
would like to thank you IRSA for giving as the chance to hold this event.
The main objective of this international conference is to explore the challenges and obstacles in
political economy of regional development, and improvement in the people’s welfare, more than
10 years after the implementation of Indonesia’s decentralization policy. The conference will
facilitate open discussions and debates, the transfer of knowledge, strategies for policy
formulation, and networking amongst researchers and policy-makers. Moreover, this event also
intends to facilitate academicians in Indonesia to be a part of international communities.
I hope this conference will contribute to the development in Indonesia. Together with other
academicians, policy makers and practitioners alike, we are ready to face the challenges ahead of
us and to be part of the team to build a better future of our nation. To achieve this, this
conference should be a great opportunity to exchange the knowledge and the information in many
aspects.
Finally, let me wish you an enjoyable time here in Makassar and I hope you will all have fruitful
sessions and discussion. On behalf of the Economic Faculty and UNHAS, I welcome you to this
conference.
Prof. Dr. Gagaring Pagalung
Dean of Faculty of Economics, Universitas Hasanuddin
xGreetings from the Indonesian Regional Science Association (IRSA)
Dear friends and colleagues,
On behalf of the Indonesian Regional Science Association, it is a great pleasure to
welcome you to Makassar, Indonesia, The 12th IRSA International Conference, 2-3
June, 2014. The theme of this year’s conference – The Political Economy of
Regional Development in Indonesia - is very timely because the people will use
their democratic right to decide the country’s political leadership for 5 years to come.
IRSA was established in 1997 and now has been recognized as one of the few academic
organizations that has been actively promoting the advancement of research through broad
participations of researchers across the country. Every year since its establishment, IRSA annual
conference has been always attended by a large number of regional scientists from all over
Indonesia. A network of regional scientists facilitated by IRSA has now grown to reach a critical
mass of scientists from various disciplines that can play a major role not only in the academic arena
through research and publications, but also contribute to the evidence-based regional development
policies nationally, regionally, and locally.
As I understand, this year's conference will be attended by around 200 regional scientists from all
over Indonesia and beyond. I do hope that the conference participants can use this opportunity to
learn from other regional scientists and extend their research network for further opportunities.
Finally, on behalf of IRSA I wish that you will enjoy the conference program and your visit this
lovely city. Welcome to Makassar!
Prof. Armida Alisjahbana
President of Indonesian Regional Science Association
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The 12th Indonesian Regional Science Association (IRSA) Conference
Date: Monday, 02/Jun/2014
8:00am
-
9:00am
Registration
9:00am
-
9:30am
OPE: Opening Ceremony
Location: Ballroom
9:30am
-
10:15am
KEY: Keynote Speech
Location: Ballroom
PROF. ARMIDA ALISJAHBANA
President of IRSA / Minister of National and Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) / Padjadjaran University
10:15am
-
10:30am
Coffee Break
10:30am
-
12:00pm
PLE-1: Plenary Session 1
Location: Ballroom
Chair: Arief Anshory Yusuf, Padjadjaran University; arief.yusuf@fe.unpad.ac.id
PROF. IWAN JAYA AZIS
Cornell University / Asian Development Bank (ADB)
Mea Culpa
PROF. ARI KUNCORO
University of Indonesia (UI)
Complex Interplay of Factors in the Institutional Model of Decentralization: Theory and Application
Iwan Jaya Azis
Asian Development Bank (ADB), Indonesia
12:00pm
-
1:00pm
Luncheon
1:00pm
-
3:00pm
PAR-1A: Housing,
Education, Transportation
and other Regional
Infrastructures Issues
Location: Room A
Identifying
Infrastructures Critical
to MP3EI Continuity
During and Post Civil
Contingency
Prananda Navitas
Sepuluh Nopember Institute
of Technology, Surabaya,
Indonesia
The Relationship
between Tax
Compliance and Tax
Education
Ida Zuraida
Training Tax Center, Ministry
of Finance, Indonesia
The Effectiveness of
Economic and Social
Infrastructures in
PAR-1B: Political Economy
and Governance of
Regional Development
Location: Room B
The Implementation of
Good Government
Governance for Welfare
of society on Local
Government in South
and South-East
Sulawesi.
Abdul Hamid Habbe,
Mulyati Akib, Sitti Haerani,
Yohanis Rura
Faculty of Economic and
Business of Hasanuddin
University, Indonesia
The Implementation
Sandalwood (Santalum
Album L) Conservation
Strategies in Timor
Tengah Selatan District
of Nusa Tenggara Timur
Province
Nursalam Jeppu
PAR-1C: Poverty, Inequality
and Inter-regional
Disparities
Location: Room C
The Implication of
Interregional Income
Disparity on Household
Health Quality: The
Case of Indonesia
Hilda Leilani Masniarita
Pohan
Parahyangan Catholic
University, Indonesia
Inequality Impact on
Industrialization in
Indonesia : A Study
across All-provincial
Region
Davy Hendri1, Heru
Gunawan2
1: Islamic Economic
Department, IAIN Imam
Bonjol, Padang; 2: Ministry of
Industry of Republic of
Indonesia
PAR-1D: Public Policy,
Regional and Urban
Planning and Regional
Development
Location: Room D
The Economy-Wide
Impact of Increasing
Natural Gas
Production and
Utilization on the
Indonesian Economy
Djoni Hartono1,
Nurkholis -1, Aldi
Hutagalung2
1: Universitas Indonesia,
Indonesia; 2: University of
Twente, Netherlands
Impact of Health
Insurance on Saving
and Consumption
Expenses in
Indonesia (Evidence
from Indonesian
Family Life Survey)
Sunaryati -
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Dominicus Savio
Priyarsono, Ida Bagus
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Bogor Agricultural University,
Indonesia
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Dynamic Picture in the
Decentralization Era of
Indonesia
Asri Yusrina, Palmira
Permata Bachtiar
SMERU Research Institute,
Indonesia
University of Nusa Cendana
Kupang, Indonesia
Do the Rate of Profit
and Organic
Composition in Central
Java Industry Increase
in the Long Run? A Test
of Heterodox Political
Economy Perspective
Bhimo Rizky Samudro,
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Sebelas Maret University
Surakarta, Indonesia
Poverty or Politics: A
Study of Targeted
Community-Based
Development Programs
in Indonesia
Inggrid -
Petra Christian University,
Indonesia
Local Government
Reform and Poverty
Reduction in Indonesia:
A Case Study of
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Team for the
Eradication of Poverty
(Tim Koordinasi
Penanggulangan
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Sirojuddin Arif
Northern Illinois University,
Indonesia
UIN Sunan Kalijaga,
Indonesia
The Role of Birth
Order in Infant
Mortality in Indonesia
2012
Rudi Salam
Institute of Statistics,
Jakarta, Indonesia
Effect of Hereditary
Risk of
Cardiovascular
Diseases to the
Individual Willingness
to Pay of Health
Insurance Premium
Restiatun Massardi
Tanjungpura University,
Indonesia
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Regional and Urban
Planning and Regional
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Location: Room E
Regional Public
Expenditure Strategy
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Regional Economic
Growth, Poverty Rate,
and Human
Development Index
Mansur Afifi
Faculty of Economics
University of Mataram,
Indonesia
Electoral Accountability
of Local Government in
Post-Decentralized
Indonesia: Does
Economy Matters?
Rumayya Batubara
University of Western
Australia, Australia
Budget Process and
Performance of Public
Budget of Local
Government in
Indonesia
Harryanto Endhy
Faculty of Economics,
Hasanuddin University,
Indonesia
The Low of Human
Resources Quality:
Evidence From The
Textile and Food
PAR-1F: Public Policy,
Regional and Urban
Planning and Regional
Development
Location: Room F
The Effect of Human
Development Index
Indicators on Economic
Growth in Central
Sulawesi Province
Junaidin -1, Mohammad
Ahlis Djirimu2, Andi
Darmawati Tombolotutu3
1: Regional Development
Planning Agency (BAPPEDA)
Central Sulawesi, Indonesia;
2: Department of Economics
& Development Study,
Faculty of Economics,
Tadulako University,
Indonesia; 3: Faculty of
Economics, Muhammadiyah
University of Palu, Central
Sulawesi, Indonesia
A Survey Study of
Indonesian Local Public
Financial Management
Capacity Building
Programs’ impact on
Local Financial Annual
Report Performance
Kodrat wibowo1, bambang
Juanda2, Lenard Milich3
1: padjadjaran university,
Indonesia; 2: Bogor Institute
of Agriculture; 3: GIZ
Health Care Financing
Reforms Across
Districts in Indonesia
PAR-1G: Regional /
International Trade, Finance
and Inflation
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Patronage Buying
Motives of Coffee
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Center for Policy Analysis
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A Computable
General Equilibrium
Model
Djoni Hartono1, Tony
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Indonesia; 3: Universitas
Padjadjaran, Indonesia
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University, Australia
Trade Map and
Competitiveness
Analysis of the
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International Market
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Industries Industrial
Intensity and Elasticity
of Substitution in The
Central Java Province
Agung Riyardi, Bambang
Setiaji
Faculty of Economics and
Business, Muhammadiyah
University of Surakarta,
Indonesia
Sri Budiati1, Athia Yumna1,
Nila Warda1, Robert
Sparrow2, Asep Suryahadi1,
Arjun Bedi3
1: SMERU Research
Institute, Indonesia; 2:
Crawford School of Public
Policy, Australian National
University; 3: International
Institute of Social Studies,
Erasmus University
Rotterdam
Competitiveness Issues
in Indonesia
Haryo Aswicahyono1, Hal
Hill2, Edimon Ginting3,
Priasto Aji3
1: Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS),
Indonesia; 2: Australian
National University, Australia;
3: Asian Development Bank
(ADB), Indonesia
Uncertainty: The Case
of Indonesia
Mochammad Firman
Hidayat
Ministry of National
Development Planning
(BAPPENAS), Indonesia
Purnamadewi, Tanti
Novianti, Anggi Meiri
Bogor Agricultural
University, Indonesia
Social Responsibility
Accounting: A Way to
Sustainable
Development (Case
Study of PT. Semen
Tonasa in South
Sulawesi)
Amiruddin Antong,
Valentino Aris, Hijir
Ismail
Hasanuddin University,
Indonesia
3:00pm
-
3:15pm
Coffee Break
3:15pm
-
5:15pm
PAR-2A: Housing,
Education, Transportation
and other Regional
Infrastructures Issues
Location: Room A
Municipal Bond as the
Financing of MRT
Jakarta Project
Eko Nursurachman, Hadi
Setiawan
Fiscal Policy Agency, Ministry
of Finance, Indonesia
The Use and Usefulness
of BOS Program
Vita Febriany, Nina
Toyamah, Mayang Rizky
Lembaga Penelitian SMERU,
Indonesia
Top Gear Race: The
Estimation of Society’s
Choice on
Transportation Mode
I Wayan Sukadana, Amrita
Nugraheni Saraswaty, I
Gusti Ayu Putri Anggara
Indraswari
Udayana University,
Indonesia
Public Housing Policy
for Low-Income
Communities in
Indonesia
Rita Helbra Tenrini
Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry
PAR-2B: Political Economy
and Governance of
Regional Development
Location: Room B
Influence of
Macroeconomic
Indicators Against
Poverty Rate In
Moluccas Province
Elsina Huberta Aponno,
Zany Irayati Aunalal,
William G. M.
Louhenapessy
Hasanuddin University,
Indonesia
Creating Middle Class
as Political Economy
Choice
Windhiarso P.A.
Putranto1,3, Indra -2,3
1: Central Bureau Statistics,
Indonesia; 2: Bogor
Agricultural University,
Indonesia; 3: University of
Indonesia, Indonesia
Politically Driven
Budget Cycle in
Indonesia: Can the
Voters be Influenced?
Vid Adrison
LPEM FEUI, Indonesia
Corporate Social
Responsibility PT. Free
Port Welfare of
Community District
PAR-2C: Poverty, Inequality
and Inter-regional
Disparities
Location: Room C
Regional Inequalities of
Indicators of
Employment and Wages
in Indonesia
Zulfan Tadjoeddin
University of Western
Sydney, Australia
Analysis of Poverty
Determinant in West
Jawa Province
Sartika Djamaluddin
Faculty of Economics,
University of Indonesia,
Indonesia
Empowerment of Small
Industrial Tempe for
Poverty Reduction
Rusdarti -
Semarang State University,
Indonesia
Interregional Allocation
of Capital with Spillover
Effects in the
Indonesia’s Pre- and
Post-Crisis Economy
Mitsuhiko Kataoka
Chiba Keizai University,
Japan
PAR-2D: Public Policy,
Regional and Urban
Planning and Regional
Development
Location: Room D
The Impact of Local
Government
Expenditure on Local
Economic Growth in a
Pre-Decentralization
and Post-
Decentralization
Period; The Case on
Subnational
Governments in
Indonesia
Dewa Putu Ekayana
Fiscal Policy Office,
Ministry of Finance,
Indonesia
What Drives Local
Service Delivery
Performance in
Indonesia?
Blane Lewis1, Neil
Andrew McCulloch2,
Audrey Sacks1
1: The World Bank,
Indonesia; 2: Australian
Embassy, Indonesia
Implications of
Inequality on
Targeting
Performance:
Evidence from
Decentralized and
117
of Finance, Indonesia Mimika Papua Province
Syarifuddin Said, Musafir
Yala, Normiyati -
Hasanuddin University,
Indonesia
Centralized Social
Protection Programs
in Indonesia
Armand Arief Sim, Radi
Negara, Asep Suryahadi
SMERU Research
Institute, Indonesia
The Deconcentration
of Small-Scale
Industry in Jakarta
Metropolitan Region
Zulqadri Ansar
Bandung Institute of
Technology, Indonesia
PAR-2E: Public Policy,
Regional and Urban
Planning and Regional
Development
Location: Room E
The Impact of Double
Taxation for The Central
and Local Taxes (Case
Study of Restaurant and
Hotel Tax)
Benny Gunawan
Ardiansyah
Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry
of Finance, Indonesia
Intergovernmental
Transfer and Income
Redistribution: The
Impact of General
Purpose and Special
Purpose Grant on
Income Inequality and
the Role of Public
Participation on Local
Governance
Martin Hasiholan
Lumbantobing
Ministry of Finance,
Indonesia
Effective Transition to
Climate Change
Adaptation Through
Capacity Building
Enhancement in
Indonesia: Learning
from Developing
Countries
Rahayu Yoseph-Paulus
Regional Development
Planning Agency (BAPPEDA)
Kendary City, Indonesia
The Definition of
Related Party in
Taxation Cases in
Indonesia
Muhammad Rifky Santoso
PAR-2F: Regional /
International Trade, Finance
and Inflation
Location: Room F
The Relationship
Between Technical
Efficiency and Pricing in
the Indonesian Banking
Sector
Nury Effendi1, Rina
Indiastuti2, Maman
Setiawan3
1: Universitas Padjadjaran,
Indonesia; 2: Universitas
Padjadjaran, Indonesia; 3:
Universitas Padjadjaran,
Indonesia
Competitiveness
Analysis and Indonesia
Policy Strategies
Towards ASEAN
Economic Community
2015
Etty Soesilowati, Dyah
Maya Nihayah, Deki Aji
Suseno, Nurjannah Rahayu
Kistanti
Semarang State University,
Indonesia
Economic Growth,
Regional Revenue
(PAD), and General
Allocation Fund (DAU),
of Allocation of Capital
Expenditure
Darmawati Juanda1, Riny
Jefri2, Ratna Sari1
1: Hasanuddin University,
Indonesia; 2: Makassar State
University, Indonesia
The Cooperative Banks
and Rural Banks in Italy:
A Model of Development
Based on the Mutuality,
Localism and
Democracy
PAR-2G: Regional /
International Trade, Finance
and Inflation
Location: Room G
An Econometric
Assesment National and
Provincial Inflation in
Indonesia Under
Inflation Targeting
Framework (2005:07-
2013:12)
Yoke Muelgini
Fakultas Ekonomi dan Bisnis
Universitas Lampung,
Indonesia
A STUDY OF
INDONESIA’S
EXTERNAL
ADJUSTMENS USING
MONETARY
APPROACH 2000-2012
Abdul Hamid Paddu
Hasanuddi University,
Indonesia
The Effects of
Commodity Export
Prices on The Exchange
Rate Adjustment in
Indonesia
Indraswati Tri Abdi Reviane
Hasanuddin University,
Indonesia
Comparative Advantage
and Export Market
Prices Integration of
Indonesia and Malaysia
Ni Putu Wiwin Setyari
Udayana University,
Indonesia
PAR-2H: Urban,
Agriculture and Rural
Development
Location: Room H
Three Models of
Public Private
Partnership in
Agriculture Sector
Dominicus Savio
Priyarsono, Eka
Puspitawati
Bogor Agricultural
University, Indonesia
Viability of Organic
Farming: Case Study
of West Java province
Noknik K Herawati,
Januarita Hendrani, Siwi
Nugraheni
Universitas Katolik
Parahyangan, Indonesia
Institutional
Arrangements of SRI
(System of Rice
Intensification)
Method through
Payments for
Environmental
Services to Increase
Food Production and
Urban Water
Availability in
Jatiluhur Irrigation
Area
Luh Putu Suciati1,
Bambang Juanda1,
Akhmad Fauzi2, Ernan
Rustiadi3
1: Regional & Rural
Development Planning
Science, IPB, Indonesia;
2: Department of
Resource and
Environmental Economics,
IPB, Indonesia; 3: Center
for Regional System
Analysis, Planning and
Development
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Ministry of Finance,
Indonesia
Giuseppe Confessore1,2,
Maurizio Turina3, Sandro
Turina1,2,4
1: National Research
Council, Roma, Italy; 2:
Department of Engineering,
University of Rome Tor
Vergata, Roma, Italy; 3:
European University of
Rome, Roma, Italy; 4:
Consortium Between Italian
Mutual Insurance and
Assistance (COMIPA),
Roma, Italy
(CrestPent),IPB, Indonesia
Using the Profit and
Maximization Cost
Minimazation: Case
Study Sub-District III
Banyuasin Banyuasin
Lamazi Sauki, Febrianty
Mustafa, Eva Novaria
Sriwijaya University,
Indonesia
5:15pm
-
7:00pm
Free Time
7:00pm
-
9:00pm
Gala Dinner
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Date: Tuesday, 03/Jun/2014
8:00am
-
8:30am
Registration
8:30am
-
10:30am
PAR-3A: Housing &
Political Economy
Location: Room A
Drops of Happiness:
How Indonesian Value
Water Access in Their
Household
Anissa Rahmawati
Padjadjaran University,
Indonesia
Cemetery Management
in Jakarta for Its Impact
on Its Surrounding
Regions
Raditya Hari Murti
Laboratory of Espace Nature
et Culture, University of Paris
IV, France
Why Indonesia Needs
Low-Cost Carriers to
Boost Its Tourism
Sector?
Risky Ismiaji, Adhitya
Wardhana
Padjadjaran University,
Indonesia
The Political Economy
of Local Public Good
Provision Some
Evidence from
Indonesia
Ni Made Sukartini
Airlangga University,
Indonesia
PAR-3B: Political Economy
and Governance of
Regional Development
Location: Room B
Determinants of
Indonesia's Food
Security in 1961-2009
Nur Afni Panjaitan, Retno
Andrini
Universitas Padjadjaran,
Indonesia
Forest management in
Aceh province,
Indonesia: A political
economy perspective.
Cut Augusta M. Anandi, Ida
Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo,
Mella Komalasari
CIFOR, Indonesia
The Effects of Minimum
Wage on Youth
Employment: Evidence
from Indonesia
Devanto Shasta Pratomo
Brawijaya University,
Indonesia
Political Economy of
Extractive Industries
Governance in
Resource-Rich Regions
in Indonesia: Paradox of
Plenty and Opportunies
to Overcome
Ermy Sri Ardhyanti1, Hasrul
Hanif2
1: Article 33 Indonesia; 2:
Gadjah Mada University
PAR-3C: Poverty, Inequality
and Inter-regional
Disparities
Location: Room C
What is the Impact of
Economic Growth on
Poverty Incidence? The
Evidence of ASEAN-4
during Global Financial
Crisis
Nur Ain Shahrier
Bank Negara Malaysia,
Malaysia
Inter-Provincial Income
Disparity in Indonesia:
Further Evidence
Hiroshi Sakamoto
The International Centre for
the Study of East Asian
Development, Japan
Whether Regionalism in
ASEAN Can Accelerate
Income Convergence?
Dedi Budiman Hakim,
Manuntun Parulian
Hutagaol, Dian Verawati
Panjaitan, Sri Retno Wahyu
Nugraheni
Bogor Agricultural University,
Indonesia
The Impact of Energy
and Food Price
Fluctuation to other
Commodities,
Households and
Poverty in Indonesia:
SAM Approach
Misdawita -, Djoni Hartono
University of Indonesia,
Indonesia
PAR-3D: Public Policy,
Regional and Urban
Planning and Regional
Development
Location: Room D
Desentralisation of
the Train Operation
Akhmad Yasin
Ministry of Finance,
Indonesia
Redistribution of
Tobacco Product
Excise to Support
Local Government
Efforts in Coping with
the Negative Impact
of Smoking
Eddy Mayor Putra Sitepu
Fiscal Policy Agency,
Indonesia
National Land Policy:
The Third National
Medium Term
Development Plan's
Background Study
Mia Amalia, Oswar M
Mungkasa, Uke M
Hussein, Raffli Noor,
Idham Khalik
Bappenas
The Payment Ability
Analysis on Disaster
Insurance Program
Adrianus Dwi Siswanto
Ministry of Finance, Fiscal
Policy Office, Indonesia
PAR-3E: Public Policy,
Regional and Urban
Planning and Regional
Development
Location: Room E
Fiscal Decentralization
and Economic Growth:
Case of Indonesia
Yozi Aulia Rahman,
Prasetyo Ari Bowo,
Kusumantoro -, Amin
Pujiati
Semarang State University,
Indonesia
PAR-3F: Regional /
International Trade, Finance
and Inflation
Location: Room F
The Effect of Employee
Expectation of Stock
Price and Employee
Stock Ownership
Satisfaction on
Employee
Organizational
Commitment in PT.
Telekomunikasi
Indonesia, Tbk
PAR-3G: Urban, Agriculture
and Rural Development
Location: Room G
Adaptation Strategy on
Flood Mitigation in
Central Java, Indonesia
Evi Gravitiani, Suryanto -
Sebelas Maret University,
Indonesia
Coping Climate Change
Risk in Indonesia:
Supply Side Analysis of
PAR-3H: Urban,
Agriculture and Rural
Development
Location: Room H
Comparative Study of
Institutional Food
Security in West Nusa
Tenggara
Enirawan -, Setia Hadi,
Bambang Juanda, Ernan
Rustiadi
IPB, Indonesia
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Measuring Economic
Benefit from Bank
Sampah in Depok
Alin Halimatussadiah, Diah
Widyawati
Faculty of Economics,
University of Indonesia,
Indonesia
National Spatial
Planning Policy: The
Third National Medium
Term Development
Plan’s Background
Study
Oswar M Mungkasa, Dwi H
Sutrisno, Mia Amalia,
Aswicaksana Aswito,
Agung Dorodjatoen
Ministry of National
Development Planning
(BAPPENAS), Indonesia
The Role of Bank
Sampah in Reducing
Waste: The Case of
Depok Municipality
Alin Halimatussadiah,
Shanty Meta Febrinalisa
Faculty of Economics
University of Indonesia,
Indonesia
Dian Anggraece Sigit
Parawansa, Djabir Hamzah,
Agung Susilo
Faculty of Economics,
Hasanuddin University,
Indonesia.
The Effect of Market
Orientation and
Dynamic Capabilities to
Performance of Export
Company in North
Sulawesi
Stanny Sicilia Rawung,
Nursyam Anwar, Imran
Taufik
Hasanuddin University,
Indonesia
Efficiency of People's
Credit Bank in
Indonesia : A Data
Envelopment Analysis
Ade Maulana Rahman
Hidayat, Heriyaldi -
Center for Economics and
Development Studies
(CEDS), Indonesia
Crop Insurance Market
Suryanto -, Evi Gravitiani,
Tri Mulyaningsih
Sebelas Maret University,
Indonesia
Economic Growth and
Urban Land Use in
Daerah Istimewa
Yogyakarta Urban Area
Prastowo -
Magister Ekonomika
Pembangunan FEB UGM,
Indonesia
Analysis and Direction
of Regional
Development of Lake
Tempe, South Sulawesi
Province with Regard to
Local Wisdom
Fadhil Surur1, Santun R.P
Sitorus2, Ivanovich Agusta3
1: Graduate Student of
Regional Planning Science,
Bogor Agricultural University,
Indonesia; 2: Regional
Development Planning,
Faculty of Agriculture, Bogor
Agricultural University,
Indonesia; 3: Rural Sociology
and Community
Development, Faculty of
Human Ecology, Bogor
Agricultural University,
Indonesia
Village Law: Impact
Potency for Reducing
Rural Poverty
Nur Sabrina Akmala
Putri1, Desy Ariandini2,
Lisa Shaumanissa3
1: BAPPENAS, Indonesia;
2: Coordinating Ministry for
Economic Affairs,
Indonesia; 3: BAPPENAS,
Indonesia
The Impact of Climate
Change on Price of
Agriculture Product
and Its Implication on
the Indonesian
Economy: A Dynamic
General Equilibrium
Analysis
Wawan Hermawan1,
Sutyastie Soemitro1,
Arief A. Yusuf1, Djoni
Hartono2
1: Universitas Padjadjaran,
Indonesia; 2: Universitas
Indonesia, Indonesia
The Effect of Rice
Protection on
Agriculture
Household Welfare in
Indonesia
Zainul Arifin
Ministry of Finance,
Indonesia
10:30am
-
10:45am
Coffee Break
10:45am
-
12:15pm
PLE-2: Plenary Session 2
Location: Ballroom
Chair: Budy P. Resosudarmo, Australian National University; budy.resosudarmo@anu.edu.au
PROF. ANNE BOOTH
SOAS, University of London
"Before the ‘Big Bang’: Decentralization Debates and Practice in Indonesia, 1949–99"
PROF. BAMBANG BRODJONEGORO
Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of Finance
Before the ‘Big Bang’: Decentralization Debates and Practice in Indonesia, 1949–99
Anne Booth
SOAS, University of London, United Kingdom
12:15pm
-
1:15pm
Luncheon
1:15pm
-
3:15pm
PAR-4A: Political Economy
and Governance of
Regional Development
Location: Room A
The Dynamics of
Monetary and Financial
Policies in Global
Financial Crisis in
Indonesia
PAR-4B: Political Economy
and Governance of
Regional Development
Location: Room B
Value Adding in
Indonesian Mining: A
Current Issue in
Historical Perspective
Pierre van der Eng
PAR-4C: Poverty, Inequality
and Inter-regional
Disparities
Location: Room C
Revenue Sharing and its
Impact on Inter and Intra
Province Economic
Disparity
Riatu Mariatul Qibthiyyah,
PAR-4D: Poverty,
Inequality and Inter-
regional Disparities
Location: Room D
Determinants of Pro
Poor Growth in Java
Atik Mar'atis Suhartini1,
Rinda Fitriani2
1: Institute of Statistics,
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Marsuki -
Hasanuddin University,
Indonesia
Local Governance and
Outcomes
Arianto Arif Patunru1,
Erman Avantgarda
Rahman2
1: Australian National
University, Australia; 2: The
Asia Foundation
Economic Indicators
and Re-election
Prospect: the Case of
Indonesia
Aditia Febriansyah, Yangki
Imade Suara
Center for Economics and
Development Studies,
Padjadjaran University,
Indonesia
To Vote or Not to Vote:
An Empirical Evidence
of Indonesian Voters
Behaviour
Iqbal Dawam Wibisono,
Abdul Afif, Anissa
Rahmawati
Padjadjaran University,
Indonesia
Australian National
University, Australia
Political Economy
Analysis for Rent
Seeking Behavior in
Maintenance and Repair
Pantura Java Roads
Project
Bramastyo Agung Wibowo,
Fatimah Zachra Fauziah,
Dara Ayu Lestari
Bogor Agriculture University,
Indonesia
Socio-economic
Determinants of
Knowledge about
HIV/AIDS in Eastern
Indonesia
Dani Alfah, Firman Witoelar
SurveyMETER, Indonesia
Can Government
Reduce Poverty through
Its Expenditure?
Wesly Febriyanta
Sinulingga
Fiscal Policy Unit, Ministry of
Finance, Indonesia
Sartika Djamaludin
Universitas Indonesia,
Indonesia
Analysis of Elderly and
Adolescent Utilisation in
Health Care Center in
Indonesia
Yuni Rahyani Ni Komang1,
Edy Purwanto2, Fajar
Suminto2, Muhammad
Mulia2, Tiara Marthias3
1: Polytechnique of Health,
Indonesia; 2: SurveyMETER,
Indonesia; 3: KMPK, Gadjah
Mada University, Indonesia
Poverty, Inequality and
Inter-Regional
Disparities in Poso
Region, Central
Sulawesi Province,
Indonesia: In
Perspective Agricultural
Sector
M. R. Yantu1, Bakri
Hasanuddin2, Sidik
Purnomo3, Jusak Tomy4
1: Faculty of Agriculture,
Tadulako University,
Indonesia; 2: Faculty of
Economics, Tadulako
University, Indonesia; 3:
Board of Affair Official of
Labor and Transmigration,
Central Sulawesi, Indonesia;
4: Board of Research and
Development of Regional,
Central Sulawesi, Indonesia
Jakarta, Indonesia; 2:
Central Bureau of
Statistics, Indonesia
The Role of Education
in Poverty Reduction
in Western and
Eastern Indonesia
Rofiq Nur Rizal, Atik
Mar'atis Suhartini
Institute of Statistics,
Jakarta, Indonesia
The Impact of Growth
Economic, Regional
Economic Disparity
and Workers
Absorbed to The
Public Welfare in
Residence and City of
North Maluku
Province
Abdul Wahab Hasyim,
Nahu Daud, Muhammad
Hasnin, Chairullah Amin
Khairun University,
Ternate, Indonesia
Poverty challenges in
Eastern Indonesia:
some new evidence
from a multi-topic
household survey
Firman Witoelar
SurveyMETER, Indonesia
PAR-4E: Poverty, Inequality
and Inter-regional
Disparities
Location: Room E
Objective Poverty and
Subjective Well-being
Poverty in Indonesia:
Study Case Parepare,
West Sumbawa and
Bangka Belitung
Mukhammad Fajar
Rakhmadi
SMERU Research Institute,
Indonesia
CONVERGENCE OF
INCOME AMONG
PROVINCES IN
INDONESIA: STATIC
AND DYNAMIC PANEL
DATA APPROACH
Bayu Kharisma, Viktor
Pirmana
Faculty of Economic and
Business, Padjadjaran
University, Indonesia
PAR-4F: Poverty & Public
Policy
Location: Room F
Poverty Map of
Indonesia 2010: An
Application of Small
Area Estimation Method
Radi Negara
SMERU Research Institute,
Indonesia
Bottom up Planning
Model: Re-development
Winongo Riverfront in
Yogyakarta
Derajad Sulistyo
Widhyharto
Department of Sociology,
Gadjah Mada University,
Indonesia
Fiscal Policy Analysis
on Climate Change and
Its Impact on
Indonesian Economy: A
General Equilibrium
PAR-4G: Public Policy,
Regional and Urban
Planning and Regional
Development
Location: Room G
Padalarang Station Area
to Become Transit
Oriented Neighborhood
as Part of Bandung
Urban Railway
Fachmy Sugih Pradifta
Bandung Institute of
Technology, Indonesia
Impact Analysis of
Government Transfer
Fund on Income
Inequality in Indonesia:
Panel Data Study in 32
Provinces, 2001-2010
Adhitya Wardhana1, Kodrat
Wibowo1, Bambang
Juanda2, Hermanto Siregar2
1: Padjadjaran University,
Indonesia; 2: Bogor Institute
of Agriculture
PAR-4H: Public Policy,
Regional and Urban
Planning and Regional
Development
Location: Room H
Measuring Banda
Aceh's Economic
Resilience
Dian Rahmawati,
Prananda Navitas
Institut Teknologi Sepuluh
Nopember, Indonesia
Oo Transforming
Rural Region: The
Effects of
International
Remittances to Local
Development
Mada Sophianingrum
Doctorate Geography and
Development at Le Centre
d'Etudes en Sciences
Sociales sur les mondes
Africains, Américains et
Asiatiques (CESSMA),
Université Paris Diderot,
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Analysis of Wage
Inequality in Indonesia
Nugraheni Kusumaningsih
Fiscal Policy Office (Badan
Kebijakan Fiskal), Indonesia
Analysis
Wawan Hermawan
Universitas Padjadjaran,
Indonesia
The Role and
Contribution of
Handicraft Industry of
Batik Lurik (Lutik) to
Improve the Progress of
Regional Development
in Klaten Regency -
Central Java, Indonesia
Mulyanto -1,2
1: Faculty of Economic and
Business, Sebelas Maret
University (UNS) Surakarta,
Indonesia; 2: The Centre for
Information and Regional
Development (PIPW) - LPPM
UNS Surakarta, Indonesia
Monitoring Economic
Activity in Indonesia
using Night Light
Detected from Space
Susan Olivia1, Lars
Brabyn2, John Gibson2,
Glen Stichbury2
1: Monash University,
Australia; 2: University of
Waikato, New Zealand
Practice to Build a
Collaboration Model
between Southeast
Asian Area for
Sustainable Regional
Development
Yoko Mayuzumi1, Takeshi
Mizunoya2, Yoshiro
Higano2
1: Bunkyo University, Japan;
2: University of Tsukuba,
Japan
France
The Influence of
Budget Control and
Monitoring to Good
Governance in
Succeeding Regional
Autonomy
Lince Bulutoding, Rika
Dwi Ayu Parmitasari,
Nasruddin Amin
Student of Doctoral
Program in Economics,
Hasanuddin University,
Indonesia
Effect of Regional
Economy Fiscal
Capacity in the
District/City South
Sumatra Province
Evi Doni, Eva Novaria,
Abdul Bashir
Sriwijaya University,
Indonesia
3:15pm
-
3:30pm
Coffee Break
3:30pm
-
5:30pm
PAR-5A: Political Economy
and Governance of
Regional Development
Location: Room A
Can Indonesia’s Fiscal
Policy be Sustained,
Without Rising Debt?
Tari Lestari
Ministry of National
Development Planning
(BAPPENAS), Indonesia
INTERCONECTED AND
BASE SECTORS IN
NORTH MALUKU
PROVINCE ; AN INPUT-
OUTPUT ANALYSIS
Abdul Wahab Hasyim, M.
Jaiz Samiun, Chairullah
Amin
Khairun University of
Ternate, Indonesia
PAR-5B: Urban, Agriculture
and Rural Development
Location: Room B
Revitalisation of
Agriculture
Performance in Central
Java Province by
Empowering Agriculture
Extension Institutions
and Competitiveness of
Food Stock Regions
Sucihatiningsih Dian
Wisika Prajanti, Shanty
Oktavilia, Fafurida -
Semarang State University,
Indonesia
Alternative Energy
Potential from Tawau
Geothermal System and
Environmental
Challenges, Sabah,
Malaysia
Awang Sufiyan A. Hamid,
Sanudin Tahir, Baba Musta,
Mohd. Sazaly Basarain
Universiti Malaysia Sabah,
Malaysia
Wage Modes and
Productivity: A Quantile
Regression Approach to
Testing the Nutrition
Model of the Efficiency
Wage Theory
PAR-5C: Public Policy,
Regional and Urban
Planning and Regional
Development
Location: Room C
Reshaping
Intergovernmental
Transfer in Indonesia
for a Better Future
Sumedi Andono Mulyo
Ministry of National
Development
Planning/National
Development Planning
Agency (Bappenas),
Indonesia
PUBLIC SPENDING
ANALYSIS IN VALDIVIA
MUNICIPALITY (A case
study the experience of
decentralization at the
local level in Chile)
Thres Sanctyeka1, Wiriadi
Sutrisno2
1: Technisce Universitat
Dortmund, Germany; 2:
Unindra, Jakarta, Indonesia
Formulation of
Sustainable City Index:
An Instrument for
Measuring National
Urban Development
Zaenal Arifin
PAR-5D: Public Policy,
Regional and Urban
Planning and Regional
Development
Location: Room D
Effect of
Unemployment and
Human Development
Index of Regional
Gross Domestic
Product per Capita
and Poverty in Papua
Province
Sujatmiko Darso, Yendra
Sofyan, Sitti Sakirah
Hasanuddin University,
Indonesia
Inclusive Green
Economy (IGE)
Assessment towards
Sustainable
Development of East
Kalimantan
Yusniar Juliana
Nababan1, Yusman
Syaukat1, Bambang
Juanda1, Slamet
Sutomo2
1: Bogor Agricultural
University, Indonesia; 2:
Insititute of Statistics,
Indonesia
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Kazutoshi Nakamura
University of Nagasaki,
Japan
Ministry of National
Development
Planning/Bappenas,
Indonesia
PAR-5E: Rural Development
and Urban Planning
Location: Room E
The Impact Analysis of
Regional Autonomy on
Internal Migration in
Indonesia
Yeti Lis Purnamadewi,
Dwinda Larasati Widyaputri
Bogor Agricultural University,
Indonesia
A Strategy to Increase
the Competitiveness of
Potatoes Commodity in
Dieng Plateau
Y. Titik Haryati1, Karsinah -
2, Avi Budi Setiawan3,
Murwatiningsih -2
1: Satya Wacana University,
Indonesia; 2: Semarang
State University, Indonesia;
3: Center of Business and
Economics Research,
Indonesia
PAR-5F: Poverty, Inequality
and Inter-regional
Disparities
Location: Room F
Sustainable Livelihoods
Framework in Analyzing
Poverty in Aceh: An
Exploratory Data
Analysis
Saiful Mahdi1, Marthunis
Muhammad2
1: Syiah Kuala University,
Indonesia; 2: Bappeda Aceh,
Indonesia
Income Inequality in
East Java: A Test of the
Kuznet Inverted U
Setyo Tri Wahyudi
Brawijaya University,
Indonesia
PAR-5G: Poverty, Inequality
and Inter-regional
Disparities
Location: Room G
Transmigration
Programs in Maluku:
How Successful They
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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to study the politics of economic redistribution. Basically, there are two 
competing models of redistributive politics in the literature. First, Cox and McCubbins (1986) 
suggest that incumbent governments should distribute economic benefits toward core voters 
because they are considered as a safer investment compared to other groups. Second, Lindbeck 
and Weibull (1993) and Dixit and Londregan (1996) develop electoral competition models in 
which incumbent governments attempt to get political support by disproportionately channeling 
particularistic benefits to swing voters. I use the PNPM Mandiri community-driven 
development program in Indonesia to test whether they are any political motives behind the 
allocation of PNPM Mandiri block grants from the central to lower-level governments. The 
study finds that presidential politics does matter in the distribution of block grants.  Districts 
that were major supporters of the incumbent president in the past election are largely rewarded, 
whereas swing districts are not targeted.  
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1.  Introduction 
There has been consensus among political scientists that democratic governments have a 
tendency to give more attention to the welfare of people, especially the poor, than 
nondemocratic ones. What underlies this prediction is the model of electoral competition which 
postulates that politicians will choose policies such that they closely reflect the preference of 
the median voter (Hotelling, 1929 and Downs, 1957).  
If the literature has shown that economic outcomes are not neural to politics, the next 
natural question is: how do government authorities allocate targetable economic benefits in 
order to maximize their electoral prospects? A continuing debate on this question has leaned 
toward two competing models of electoral targeting. The first is the model of electoral 
competition by Lindbeck and Weibull (1993) and Dixit and Londregan (1996) in which 
incumbent governments attempt to get voters’ political support by disproportionately 
channeling economic benefits to swing voters (i.e. voters are ideologically indifferent between 
the alternatives) because swing voter support is decisive for region outcomes. Some empirical 
evidence underpins this hypothesis (Case, 2001; Johansson, 2003; Stokes, 2005; and Solé-Ollé 
and Sorribas, 2008). On the contrary, Cox and McCubbins (1986) argue that risk-averse 
politicians should target their own core supporters first and foremost since they are less risky 
than other voters since political actors have intensive contact with them and thus are able to 
accurately predict their strategic reaction. Several observational studies of a bias in favor of 
core voter supporters are investigated by Levitt and Snyder, 1995; Ansolabehere and Snyder, 
2006; Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa, 2006; and Nichter, 2008).  
This paper is the first attempt to test the abovementioned models of distributive politics in 
Indonesia. Specifically, I focus on the allocation of PNPM Mandiri block grants across 
Indonesian districts. As the major Indonesian community-driven development (CDD) projects, 
the main objectives of PNPM Mandiri are to reduce poverty and to increase employment 
opportunities by empowering local communities. These CDD programs constitute local 
communities to identify, plan, and implement their own development activities, whereas the 
central and regional governments provide them with a community block grant (known as 
Bantuan Langsung Masyarakat, BLM).1 PNPM Mandiri, especially the PNPM Mandiri Rural, 
has increased household welfare and has improved households access to service delivery. 
Intriguingly, the compelling effects of the program have been found in poorer and remote areas 
(PNPM Support Facility, 2011). 
1 See Section 4 for more detailed explanation on PNPM Mandiri programs.  
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Yet aside from the economic benefits, PNPM Mandiri has become a central topic of 
discussion among politicians during pre-election periods. A notable example is the second 
presidential debate in 2009 when President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the incumbent 
president, highlighted the non-trivial role of PNPM Mandiri in promoting local economic 
development, reducing poverty, and providing employment opportunities. Since then, 
opponents have accused SBY and his Democratic Party of utilizing anti-poverty targeting to 
win re-election.  
Studying the models of distributive politics in a young democratic developing country, like 
Indonesia, is considerably imperative as this country faces the challenge of providing sufficient 
public goods to society. Hence, a small difference in grant disbursement will lead to sizeable 
welfare disparities across regions. This paper also enriches the discussion of decentralized 
development programs in developing countries. From an academic perspective, the literature on 
decentralization suggests that the outcomes of a decentralized service delivery system are more 
equitable and efficient than a centralized system (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; 2005; 2006). 
However, such gains of decentralization can be distorted by any political influences. In the case 
of PNPM Mandiri, although the PNPM Mandiri block grant is allocated based on formal and 
objective criteria, it is not entirely unsusceptible to political manipulation since the executive 
and the legislative to some extent have discretionary to determine the size of the grant.2 
The paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 reviews the previous relevant 
literature, Section 3 describes the political system in Indonesia which is relevant to the period 
of the study, Section 4 gives a brief overview of PNPM Mandiri programs, Section 5 discusses 
the data and the empirical strategy, Section 6 presents the results, and Section 7 is concluding 
remarks.  
2.  Theoretical Discussion 
The theoretical understanding of redistributive politics borrows the core versus swing 
models in political science by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Dixit and Londregan (1998), 
and Cox and McCubbins (1986). Fundamentally, the literature models that politicians wish to 
win the elections. Hence, they distribute economic resources between a set of electoral 
regions. I give an overview of the two hypotheses below.  
2 As the major funding source of the program comes from the national budget, it complies with the budget 
formulation process in which the government submits a work plan to the parliament to be approved. The plan 
essentially covers fundamental macroeconomic analysis, revenue projections, and proposed expenditures for the 
upcoming budget year. PNPM Mandiri itself is one of core political concerns.  
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Dixit and Londregan (1996) develop a general model of how parties tactically redistribute 
resources to voters. The model is constructed under several assumptions. There are two parties, 
L and R, which compete within a region to maximize their votes. Voters can distinguish the 
parties according to their distinctive ideological positions and their redistributive strategies. A 
continuum of voters is rational, meaning that they care for economic benefits. Voters have an 
ideological preference 𝑥𝑥 in favor of party L than party R. The electorate comprises G 
identifiable groups, and people within each group are heterogeneous with respect to a trade-off 
between their ideological affinities vis-à-vis economic benefits. Those political parties have 
identical capabilities to allocate benefits once in office. A voter with ideological preferences for 
party R will vote for party L only if the marginal utility of redistributions to his group promised 
by party L exceeds his ideological preference for party R. The cheapest voters for a group to 
buy are those who ideologically indifferent, or those who have 𝑥𝑥 = 0. Therefore, each party 
targets its resources to a group with a high density of voters around 𝑥𝑥 = 0, representing the 
group of swing voters.  Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), however, articulate that the objectives of 
parties are not only to maximize the number of votes but also to maximize the probability of 
winning a majority of seats. For the latter, more resources should be allocated to pivotal regions 
or core voter regions, since it would be less likely to win a majority without their contributions.  
By incorporating candidates’ attitudes with respect to risks, Cox and McCubbins’s (1986) 
suggest that risk-averse candidates will overinvest in their core voters group because this group 
is considered as a safer investment. Empirically, the core voters group is identified as the group 
where the incumbent obtained a high share of votes. 
Existing empirical evidence on the allocation of targetable spending has shown no clear 
pattern. Using data on social assistance block grants, Case (2001) finds that the central 
government of Albania allocates larger grants to swing communes. She concludes that the 
incumbent president seeks to maximize the probability of his own re-election by winning a 
majority of legislative seats. Likewise, utilizing a more appropriate measure of swing voters, 
Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) also confirm that the temporary ecological grants in Sweden 
were generously allocated to municipalities with many swing voters, whereas they reject the 
core voter thesis. Consistent with this result, another Swedish country study by Johansson 
(2003) reports evidence that municipalities with high numbers of swing voters receive a larger 
proportion of intergovernmental grants.3 On the contrary, Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) find 
3 To measure the number of swing voters, Johansson (2003) uses the closeness of the last election and a new 
measure from survey data of the Swedish election studies. She finds that the latter proxy has a positive effect on 
municipal grants.  
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evidence of state transfers to local governments directed toward core voters in the US during 
1957-1997. This result is also supported by Levitt and Snyder (1995), Larcinese, Rizzo, and 
Testa (2006), and Nichter (2008). 
The major challenges in studying tactical redistribution could be attributable to the flawed 
methods employed (Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002) and to identify the exact dissimilarity of 
the two hypotheses since the variables used to measure them are very similar (e.g. vote margin 
against vote share.  In some cases, the politician might distribute benefits to thin margin regions 
in the mean time and to his own supporter regions, suggesting that both the swing-core 
hypotheses are acceptable.  
3. The Indonesian Political Institutions 
Indonesia is a republic country with a presidential system. After the Suharto’s era in 1998, 
the country has undertaken substantial political and economic reforms. One of the major 
changes has been the implementation of political and economic decentralization since 2001. 
The new idea of decentralization gives discretion to regional governments to conduct their own 
domestic affairs, while the role of the central government is only limited to foreign policies, 
national defense and security, legal systems, macroeconomic policies, and religion (Law No. 
22/1999 amended by Law No.32/2004).4 Two provinces, Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) 
and Papua, have been given status as special autonomous regions that accept government’s 
greatest priorities compared to their counterparts, such as receiving special intergovernmental 
grants (Dana Otsus). 
Looking at the political system, the general election held in 1999 has also signified the 
process of democratization in Indonesia. The election was considerably very transparent and 
proceeded without violence. For the first time, after practicing a three-party system for more 
than 20 years, there were 48 parties took part during the election to elect members of the 
parliamentary assembly (DPR/DPRD). The parliamentary election system was based on a 
closed-list proportional system in which parties gained seats in proportion to their share of the 
vote at the provincial level, and voters selected parties not candidates, meaning that the parties 
decided who would sit in the parliament (Sherlock, 2004). The Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle (PDI-P) lead by the daughter of the first president, Megawati Soekarnoputri, won the 
election. The elected parliamentary members then had legislative privileges to select the 
president. In the presidential election, however, the parliament elected Abdurrahman Wahid 
4 The Republic of Indonesia is a unitary country with a three-tier of regional government structures: province 
(provinsi), district (kabupaten/kota), and sub-district (kecamatan). All regional governments have their own 
parliamentary bodies.  
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(Gus Dur) to be Indonesia’s new president. The drama was ended when President Gus Dur was 
removed from the office and replaced by the Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri in 2001 
after an extended conflict between President Wahid and the parliament. 
The general elections in 2004 could be regarded as the most complex elections in the 
country’s history even though fewer political parties in the race than the previous elections 
(Sherlock, 2004). As usual, voters voted for DPR and DPRD members in the first round of the 
elections. Unlike the 1999 elections, the April parliamentary elections in 2004 adopted an open-
list proportional system wherein voters casted their votes for one party and chose a particular 
candidate from that party. Seats were allocated to each party on the basis of the share of the 
total vote that party received. Candidates won seats in the order in which they appeared on the 
party’s list unless a lower-ranked candidate reached a quota. Partai Golkar associated with the 
New Order Regime became the strongest party among 24 parties. Yet the Democratic Party 
founded in 2001 by the Minister of Defense, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, at that moment, 
shocked the public as the party successfully finished on the fifth place. The next round was held 
to directly elect the president and the vice president. It should be noted that only parties that 
won 5% of the national vote or won 3% of parliamentary seats were eligible for the presidential 
election. There were five contestants in the first presidential election on July 5, 2004, including 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the incumbent Megawati Soekarnoputri. The race was tough 
as one of the candidates reached the majority and was able to receive more than 20% of the 
vote in over half the provinces. This led to a run-off election between the two highest ranking 
candidates, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Megawati. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was 
finally elected as the new president in this second round election.  
The elections in 2009 demonstrated superiority of the Democratic Party and the incumbent 
president. The party became the largest faction in parliament with 26.40% of the votes. This 
achievement was beyond the 2.50% threshold for parliamentary representation and passed the 
20% threshold for nominating presidential candidates as required by the 2008 General Election 
Law. As for the presidential election, it followed an absolute majority system in which a 
candidate would become the president if he could receive over 50% of the vote and 20% of the 
votes in at least half of the provinces (Sherlock, 2009). Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won a 
surprising 60.80% of the vote in the first round election and re-elected to the presidency for the 
period 2009-2014. The incumbent’s performance in stabilizing the national economy and in 
improving the well-being of households partly explained why Indonesians casted their ballots 
for him and his party. Moreover, the incumbent’s economic platforms which were à la a left-
wing had helped Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to attract more voters (Mujani and Liddle, 2010).  
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4.  The Community-Driven Development (CDD) Program in Indonesia: PNPM Mandiri 
During the first-term in the office, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono introduced 
PNPM Mandiri programs on 30 April 2007 in Palu, Central Sulawesi. Nowadays, it becomes 
the main government’s flagship community-driven development (CDD) programs which are 
intended to reduce poverty and increase employment opportunities by promoting local 
community participation in development planning and management.  
PNPM Mandiri is made up by PNPM-Core (PNPM Inti) and PNPM-Support (PNPM 
Penguatan). The PNPM-Core program which focuses on area-based community empowerment 
programs consists of five key components. These include:  (i) PNPM Mandiri Rural initiated in 
1998 as the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP); (ii) PNPM Mandiri Urban modeled as 
the Urban Poverty Program (UPP); (iii) PNPM Mandiri Support for Poor and Disadvantaged 
Areas (SPADA) which were initiated in 2005 as the Development Acceleration Program for 
Disadvantages and Special Regions (P2KP) and have given emphasis on the socio-economic 
development of underdeveloped, post-disaster, and conflicting regions; (iv) PNPM Mandiri 
Rural Infrastructure (RIS); and (v) PNPM Mandiri Regional Socio-Economic Infrastructure 
(RISE). The last two, however, are expected to harmonize economic growth between the cores 
and their peripherals. The PNPM-Support program delivers specific services through sectoral 
programs, such as: (i) PNPM Healthy and Smart Generation (PNPM Generasi Sehat dan 
Cerdas) to support health and education; (ii) PNPM Green to assist in natural resources 
management and micro-hydro initiatives; (iii) PNPM SADI which facilitates agricultural 
development plans; (iv) PNPM Respek to accelerate development process in Papua and West 
Papua; and etcetera (PNPM Support Facility, 2011). 
The protocol of PNPM Mandiri constitutes a community to conduct open meetings 
attended by community members. During the meeting, participants may propose several 
activities as long as their designs are intended to reduce poverty (e.g. providing and renovating 
dwelling areas and provision of financial resources though saving and revolving funds and 
micro credits), are able to accelerate the achievement of the Millenium Development Goals 
(MDGs) target, strengthen capacity of local government and community, and promote good 
governance. After the collection of proposals, there will be another meeting by community 
representatives in order to make the final decision on which projects are going to be funded. It 
should be noted that proposals recommended by women’s groups will be given high priorities. 
The selected proposals will receive direct block grants (Bantuan Langsung Masyarakat, BLM) 
which are delivered to local communities at the sub-district level. The PNPM Mandiri program 
is financed through the National Budget (APBN) and Regional Budget (APBD) along with 
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private and community contributions in which the local government accounts for around 20- 
30% of the total BLM. 5 
In any year, the Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare releases a list of eligible 
sub-districts for funding. The total amount of BLM block grants to each sub-district is 
unevenly distributed, depending on the poverty rate, the number of population, and the degree 
of remoteness. Each eligible district will receive an annual block grant from approximately 
US$90,000 (Rp900 million) to US$300,000 (Rp3 billion), and the grant is continually 
distributed to the respective sub-district for at least 3 years.  Moreover, the central 
government will distribute additional block grants ranged from $10,500 to of $21,000 for 
each remote sub-district. 
The impact evaluation of PNPM Mandiri shows that PNPM Mandiri, particularly the 
PNPM Mandiri Rural, has contributed to increase the welfare and self-sufficiency of the 
poor. It has been successfully in reducing poverty among rural households, increasing income 
and consumption, opening up new employment opportunities, increasing access to basic 
services such health care, education, water and sanitation,  local infrastructure provision at 
lower costs, and developing local capacity building. It was reported that the effects have been 
stronger in poorer and remote areas (PNPM Support Facility, 2011). 
5.  Data and Empirical Strategy 
5.1 Data 
 This paper uses a large dataset containing information on all Indonesian districts from 
2010 to 2011. The data on the allocation of PNPM Mandiri block grants are extracted from 
the Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare. The data provide detailed statistics for the 
size of PNPM Mandiri block grants that comes from the budget of national and regional 
governments. More importantly, they are also disaggregated by the five types of the PNPM-
Core programs. I aggregate this dataset at the district level, thus, they can be merged with the 
other used variables which are only available at the district level.  
 As explained in the previous section, the general formula to allocate the grant to a sub-
district is determined by the level of poverty, the population density, and the geographical 
condition of the relevant region. I would rather to use a broader definition of the control 
variables which are closely associated with the main purposes of the block grant program 
under study. These represent socioeconomic conditions, demographic, educational 
5 Since 2011, the contribution from APBD source has referred to IFKD (Indeks Fiskal dan Kemiskinan Daerah) 
which indicates the levels of fiscal capacity and poverty for each district respectively.  
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attainment, health practices, and basic infrastructure. All these data are taken from the 
Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). The remaining data are the presidential 
election results in 2009 drawn from the Elections Monitoring Agency (Bawaslu). 
5.2 Empirical Strategy 
 I focus principally on the distribution of block grants to district 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡 as a function 
of a vector of variables that are supposed to be important for the PNPM Mandiri grant and a 
vector of political variables as follows: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ + 𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖      (1) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is the real per capita PNPM block grant (in the 2000 prices and in 
logarithms). The grant may take the form of PNPM Rural, PNPM Urban, PNPM RIS, and 
PNPM RISE. It is also separated based on the sources of funding, whether it come from the 
national or regional budget.  
 The first part of the vector 𝑍𝑍 captures socioeconomic variables, consisting of the real per 
capita gross regional domestic product (in the 2000 prices and in logarithms), the rate of 
unemployment, and the rate of poverty. The inclusion of the unemployment rate is motivated 
by the fact that one of goals of the PNPM grant is to increase the employment rate in the 
districts. Thus, the estimated coefficient for this variable is expected to be positive. 
Moreover, to signify differences in local population needs, it includes each district’s 
population (in logarithms).  
 I take into account that poverty is multi-faceted concept and can be defined in various 
ways.  For this reason, I expect that a poorer district has lower levels of education and health. 
The coefficients of the average years of schooling and the literacy rate which are the proxies 
for educational attainment are expected to show a negative sign. When it comes to the health 
practices, while the size of the grant is negatively related with the rate of birth assisted by 
medical staff, it should result in a positive association for the morbidity rate. The last control 
variables are the access to basic infrastructure measured by the access to basic sanitary and 
electricity. A negative is expected for the estimated coefficients associated with these 
variables. 
 The vector of 𝑃𝑃 captures our variables of interests, the two measures of political 
motivation in the block grant allocation process. The first political variable is the vote share 
of the incumbent president in the last presidential election by district.  This allows me to test 
the Cox and McCubbins (1986) model. A positive sign of the variables can be interpreted that 
the incumbent president shows favor to his supporter. The next political variable measures 
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the absolute difference in vote shares between the incumbent president and his main 
competitor in the past election. I follow Case (2001), Dahlberg and Johansson (2002), and 
Johansson (2003) to use this closeness of the election as a proxy for the swing voter group. 
By utilizing this variable, I examine the Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and 
Londregan (1996) predictions that districts with many swing voters are targeted by the 
incumbent president as a tactic to win the next election. From the theoretical prediction, a 
negative coefficient for this variable is expected.  
 Finally, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is the district specific fixed effect to account for persistent differences among 
districts that could be correlated with the allocation of the PNPM Mandiri block grant. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is 
the error term.  
6.  Results and Discussion 
A first look at the data 
 In order to get some insight into the data set used in the main analysis, Table 1 displays 
the mean, standard deviations, maximum, and minimum for the relevant variables. In addition 
to the overall variation, the table also reports the between variation that indicates the variation 
across districts and the within variation that is essentially the temporal variation.  
 
< Table 1> 
 
 From the statistics in the table, for all the used variables, it is shown that the variation 
across districts makes the largest contribution to the overall standard deviation. This 
conclusion is particularly true for the infrastructure variables (access to basic sanitary and 
access to electricity) and the variable of birth assisted by medical staff. The striking between 
variation in the rates of poverty and literacy is also noted. This inspection tells us that a fixed 
effect might be able to capture most of the variation in these variables. However, this would 
lead to insignificant coefficient estimates for the variables in the analysis. I now turn to the 
two political variables measuring the number of core and swing voters. We can observe that 
the within variation for these variables is zero. This is because, within each district, this study 
only makes use of the 2009 presidential election results. Looking at the percent voting in 
favor of the incumbent president, the mean value for this variable is very close to the number 
reported by the General Elections Commission (KPU), 59.72% against 60.80%.  
Main findings 
 This section presents main results from regression analysis based on the specification in 
equation (1). I use all the two sets of regressors as mentioned above, and the reported 
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standard errors are robust with respect to heteroscedasticity.6 Column (1)-(3) of Table 2 
provide the estimates of employing the log of the total grant received, the log of the grant 
from APBN, and finally the log of the grant from APBD.  
 The results for the core voter model are shown in Model 1. Starting with the political 
variable, the estimated coefficients are clearly significant in both estimations and have the 
expected positive sign, suggesting that the more people there are voting for the incumbent 
president in the election, the higher is the grant that the district will be received. Holding all 
else equal, a 1% increases in the district’s voting the incumbent president is associated with 
an increase in the real block grant per capita received, ranging from approximately 0.005% to 
0.007%.  
 Turning to the measure of the swing voter, although the point estimate is statistically 
different from zero, it has the unexpected positive sign, implying that the incumbent president 
allocates less grants to districts with many swing voters (Model 2 of Table 2). Does this mean 
that the incumbent tries to penalize the swing district? This finding should be interpreted with 
some caution since the closeness in the last election is not essentially the excellent measure to 
identify swing districts. The validity of this measure rests on strong assumptions that the 
distributions of ideological preferences among voters are symmetric and single peaked, 
knowing that there are only two competing parties in the race. In fact, these assumptions do 
not always hold; perhaps the distributions are right or left tailed and many people in a district 
are very conservative and consequently they would not even think about switching their 
support (Johansson, 2003).  
< Table 2> 
 
 We continue our empirical analysis by discussing the other control variables. We can see 
they all have the expected signs, except for the literacy rate and the proportion of births 
assisted by medical staff and the access to improved sanitation. We can leave the last three 
variables since they are not significant. That several control variables are not statistically 
significant is probably due to the present of fixed effects along with the short time period, and 
thus the smaller across time-variation in these regressors.  
Table 2 also confirms a substantial effect of the poverty rate on the allocation of PNPM 
Mandiri grants. This result is not surprising if we consider that the block grant is partly 
distributed according to a formula-based poverty measures. The higher the poverty rate, the 
larger the block grant to the district. The regression coefficient of unemployment, however, is 
6  I have also experimented with other specifications, but this does not affect the results.  
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statistically distinguishable from zero and is nearly half of the estimated coefficient on poverty.  
On average, there will be a 0.02% higher in the allocation of the grant per capita to a district 
with a 1% additional of the unemployment. The same is also true for the morbidity rate. In this 
case, the allocation of the grant is also higher if the morbidity rate is higher (point estimates of 
0.004 - 0.031). 
 Despite the design to allocate the grant under study differs a lot from the method used to 
distribute the intergovernmental grants, it seems that the grant addresses the horizontal equity 
as well. The estimate for population is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Notably, it is also suggested that the government puts the largest weight of this variable 
compared to the other independent variables. The existence of economies of scale in the 
provision of public goods by regional governments calls for a decrease in per capita grants 
together with population size. Moreover, because larger districts can provide public goods 
with lower resources, the central government should ideally transfer smaller economic 
benefits. 
To summarize, the understanding of the findings in Table 2, hence, lends support to Cox 
and McCubbins’s (1986) idea, stating that politicians favor their own supporters. At the 
empirical level, this evidence is line with little research on redistributive politics in 
presidential elections by the seminal paper of Wright (1974) who studies the political 
economy of the New Deal spending under President Roosevelt, and the recent works by 
Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa (2006) and Taylor (2008) that still use the US case. On the 
contrary, this study does not find any support for the swing thesis as modeled by Lindbeck 
and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1996). In the similar vein, I fail to corroborate 
the findings from Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) and Johanson (2003) for the Swedish case, 
Case (2001) for Albania, and Arulampalam et al. (2009) for India. 
Differential effects by the types of PNPM Mandiri 
 The main problem with previous studies is that they have not been able to distinguish 
types of grant programs that are more susceptible to political manipulation and whether 
different block grants are exploited to achieve different objectives. The analysis now 
proceeds to address such issues by running separate regressions for each type of the PNPM-
Core programs on our covariates. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 3 – Table 
6.7 We focus our attention to the two political variables. While none of the types of the 
PNPM-Core grants is significantly affected by the swing voter measure, the core voter 
7  Because of an extremely small sample size, I could not perform regressions that use the SPADA block grant as 
the dependent variable.  
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variable enters positively and significantly to the allocation of the PNPM Urban block grant. 
The effect of this tactical variable, however, is considerably large compared to the previous 
finding with the estimate coefficients are 0.0119 versus 0.0067 (Table 4). This result seems to 
strengthen the analysis of the 2009 elections emphasizing that the main supporter of the 
incumbent president is concentrated in urban areas and comes from the middle class. It is 
sensible that the incumbent direct more funds toward urban areas that voted favorably for 
him.  
< Table 4> 
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
This article studies the models of redistributive politics. The focus is on tactical 
redistribution in which the benevolent government disproportionately reallocates particularistic 
benefits across the country to purchase votes from certain groups of people and thus increase 
the probability of winning an election or a re-election.  
This is the first attempt to reveal any pure political motivations in the allocation of PNPM 
Mandiri block grants across districts in Indonesia. I find empirically that the districts that are 
the main supporters of the incumbent president receive larger block grants. On the other hand, I 
do not find evidence for the prediction that the incumbent government delivers more grants to 
the districts where there are a lot of swing voters. These findings are robust to a number of 
specification checks. Thus, the results suggest that the PNPM Mandiri community-based 
development program is not neutral from politics.  
Although the findings of this paper provide new insights into the tactical distribution of 
block grants in Indonesia, there are several interesting questions that leave aside for the future 
work. This study has not incorporated a model of political competition in which parties 
compete for voters’ electoral support. This issue is relevant in our case because the Indonesian 
parliament plays an important role in the newly consultative budget process, including the 
budget for PNPM Mandiri. Thus, if the party of the incumbent president wins a majority of the 
parliamentary seats, the president along with the parliament could also try to further their 
electoral prospects by diverting block grants toward specific groups.  
I have not addressed the effect of political alignment between the central government and 
lower levels of government. The idea is that the central government grants lower-tier 
governments to obtain political credits from voters in a specific region. This is obviously not a 
problem for the central government if the local government belongs to the same party. 
However, it could be problematic when there is no political alignment, since the local 
12 
 
government may refuse to receive the grant or reject to implement the project. As for PNPM 
Mandiri, it was reported that some local governments opted to take part in the program, 
especially in the early years of program implementation, and they also did not comply with the 
procedure of the program to provide joint funding from the their local budgets. More research 
in this vein is necessary to broaden the understanding of the political economy of PNPM 
Mandiri.  
Lastly, a non-trivial issue in newly democratizing country like Indonesia is the possibility 
of an electoral incumbency effect as a result of the ability of the incumbent to manipulate 
public funds to his political advantage. Moreover, many voters in Indonesia are politically 
inexperienced or uninformed. Therefore, they could be easily convinced to support the 
incumbent through extra provision of government services and benefits. Recent studies using 
data from developed countries, such as the seminal study by Lee (2008) seem to confirm this 
incumbency effect. To provide a satisfactory answer whether this also applies in Indonesia still 
needs careful investigation. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
Variables   Mean S.D. Min Max 
Total BLM Overall 13.2143 1.1937 8.0016 16.6396 
 
Between 
 
1.1833 8.0902 16.6245 
 
Within 
 
0.1617 12.4353 13.9933 
BLM from APBN Overall 12.9815 1.1810 7.5523 16.3841 
 
Between 
 
1.1725 7.6842 16.2606 
 
Within 
 
0.1458 12.2105 13.7526 
BLM from APBD Overall 11.5905 1.3017 6.9852 15.7109 
 
Between 
 
1.2670 6.9871 15.3597 
 
Within 
 
0.3012 10.7471 12.4338 
Total Rural BLM Overall 10.2181 1.1174 5.8886 13.4452 
 
Between 
 
1.0850 6.3809 13.4168 
 
Within 
 
0.2679 9.3063 11.1300 
Rural BLM from APBN Overall 9.9491 1.0942 5.6655 13.2221 
 
Between 
 
1.0634 6.1577 13.0498 
 
Within 
 
0.2590 8.8934 11.0048 
Rural BLM from APBD Overall 8.7194 1.2095 4.2792 12.4721 
 
Between 
 
1.1521 4.7714 12.1539 
 
Within 
 
0.3692 7.6602 9.7787 
Total Urban BLM Overall 8.0660 1.0602 4.6685 13.9237 
 
Between 
 
1.0323 5.1330 12.8747 
 
Within 
 
0.3095 6.9745 9.1575 
Urban BLM from APBN Overall 7.8515 1.0309 4.6685 13.7395 
 
Between 
 
1.0056 5.0811 12.6909 
 
Within 
 
0.2865 6.8029 8.9000 
Urban  BLM from APBD Overall 6.3860 1.2232 2.1499 12.1413 
 
Between 
 
1.1617 2.1499 11.0905 
 
Within 
 
0.4785 4.3855 8.3864 
Total RIS BLM Overall 9.0969 0.8027 6.7851 10.9219 
 
Between 
 
0.7928 6.8547 10.5327 
 
Within 
 
0.1882 8.4709 9.7228 
RIS BLM from APBN Overall 9.0969 0.8027 6.7851 10.9219 
 
Between 
 
0.7928 6.8547 10.5327 
 
Within 
 
0.1882 8.4709 9.7228 
Total RISE BLM Overall 9.5478 0.6288 8.0055 10.8553 
 
Between 
 
0.6319 8.0445 10.8059 
 
Within 
 
0.0445 9.4860 9.6097 
RISE BLM from APBN Overall 9.5478 0.6288 8.0055 10.8553 
 
Between 
 
0.6319 8.0445 10.8059 
 
Within 
 
0.0445 9.4860 9.6097 
GRDP Overall 15.6198 0.7146 12.8019 18.9097 
 
Between 
 
0.7126 13.5679 18.8368 
 
Within 
 
0.0580 14.8538 16.3857 
unemployment Overall 5.7697 3.3739 0.0400 21.8400 
 
Between 
 
3.1330 0.3650 20.6350 
 
Within 
 
1.2560 -0.2103 11.7497 
poverty Overall 15.0109 9.1796 1.5000 49.5800 
 
Between 
 
9.1539 1.5850 48.1700 
 
Within 
 
0.7456 10.9959 19.0259 
years of schooling Overall 7.8473 1.5711 2.0700 12.2000 
 
Between 
 
1.5693 2.0850 12.1450 
 
Within 
 
0.0899 7.3723 8.3223 
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Variables   Mean S.D. Min Max 
literacy Overall 91.9296 11.8844 27.3900 99.9500 
 
Between 
 
11.8845 27.5850 99.9450 
 
Within 
 
0.3721 88.5296 95.3296 
births assisted by medical staff Overall 75.1084 21.1476 2.8659 100.0000 
 
Between 
 
20.7876 2.9035 100.0000 
 
Within 
 
3.9410 51.2778 98.9390 
morbidity Overall 17.4534 6.7492 1.4860 51.7866 
 
Between 
 
6.0194 5.6518 47.905  
 
Within 
 
3.0587 -3.0580 37.9649 
access to adequate sanitation Overall 49.1555 23.226  0.0000 99.0930 
 
Between 
 
23.242  0.0000 98.5004 
 
Within 
 
3.760  34.2154 64.0955 
access to electricity Overall 85.8693 20.1862 0.0000 100.0000 
 
Between 
 
20.346  0.0000 100.0000 
 
Within 
 
2.7433 66.2335 105.5052 
population Overall 5.4496 0.4567 3.7885 6.6864 
 
Between 
 
0.4539 4.1618 6.6826 
 
Within 
 
0.052  4.8562 6.0429 
vote for SBY Overall 59.7241 17.3264 8.3724 97.7567 
 
Between 
 
17.3356 8.3724 97.7567 
 
Within 
 
0.0000 59.724  59.724  
swing Overall 15.8551 11.967  0.1445 47.7567 
 
Between 
 
11.9735 0.1445 47.7567 
  Within   0.0000 15.855  15.855  
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 Table 2 Determinants of PNPM Mandiri Block Grants 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
 
  Model 1    Model 2  
Variables (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
GRDP  -0.03588 -0.04518 -0.10336  -0.02871 -0.03774 -0.09559 
 (0.148) (0.156) (0.106)  (0.144) (0.151) (0.104) 
unemployment  0.02327*** 0.01553** 0.06389***  0.02322*** 0.01551** 0.06352*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.011)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) 
poverty  0.04397*** 0.03417*** 0.06283***  0.04342*** 0.03383*** 0.06174*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
years of schooling -0.12326* -0.10562 -0.10845*  -0.13599** -0.11755* -0.12478** 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.061)  (0.065) (0.067) (0.061) 
literacy 0.00653 0.00562 0.00202  0.00927 0.00839 0.00467 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
births assisted by medical staff 0.00156 0.00096 0.00519**  0.00156 0.00099 0.00507** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
morbidity 0.01131*** 0.00433** 0.03108***  0.01139*** 0.00440** 0.03119*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
access to adequate sanitation 0.00011 -0.00063 0.00138  0.00021 -0.00054 0.00162 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
access to electricity -0.00178 -0.00347* 0.00059  -0.00172 -0.00340* 0.00056 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
population -1.01193*** -0.95820*** -1.37448***  -0.97504*** -0.92049*** -1.33858*** 
 (0.196) (0.203) (0.170)  (0.192) (0.199) (0.168) 
vote for SBY 0.00671*** 0.00717*** 0.00465**     
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)     
swing     0.01569*** 0.01618*** 0.01275*** 
     (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
constant 18.29494*** 18.36607*** 18.74035***  17.97723*** 18.04535*** 18.39844*** 
 (2.620) (2.756) (2.036)  (2.570) (2.703) (2.015) 
N 935 935 935  935 935 935 
R-squared: within 0.20 0.08 0.39  0.21 0.08 0.39 
R-squared: between 0.49 0.47 0.52  0.49 0.48 0.53 
R-squared: overall 0.47 0.46 0.50  0.48 0.47 0.51 
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 Table 3 Determinants of PNPM Mandiri-Rural Block Grants 
  Model 1    Model 2  
Variables (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
GDRP -0.14406** -0.17134** -0.06961  -0.14118** -0.16680** -0.07059 
 (0.066) (0.069) (0.063)  (0.066) (0.068) (0.063) 
unemployment 0.04570*** 0.03608*** 0.06635***  0.04485*** 0.03522*** 0.06539*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.013)  (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) 
poverty 0.03454*** 0.02985*** 0.04333***  0.03386*** 0.02957*** 0.04183*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
years of schooling -0.01234 -0.01034 0.01117  -0.02128 -0.01771 -0.00154 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.070)  (0.067) (0.068) (0.070) 
literacy 0.00714 0.00767 0.00313  0.00819 0.00876 0.00407 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
births assisted by medical staff -0.00368* -0.00419** -0.00271  -0.00385* -0.00430** -0.00308 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
morbidity 0.01617*** 0.00866** 0.03018***  0.01626*** 0.00876*** 0.03030*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
access to adequate sanitation -0.00764*** -0.00699*** -0.01037***  -0.00746*** -0.00691*** -0.00989*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
access to electricity 0.00017 -0.00156 0.00541*  0.00017 -0.00156 0.00539* 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
population -1.28626*** -1.19536*** -1.56024***  -1.27185*** -1.17547*** -1.55853*** 
 (0.103) (0.102) (0.106)  (0.104) (0.102) (0.107) 
vote for SBY 0.00085 0.00165 -0.00111     
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)     
swing     0.00370 0.00456 0.00137 
     (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
constant 18.35835*** 18.31534*** 16.62850***  18.21642*** 18.12884*** 16.59039*** 
 (1.347) (1.396) (1.306)  (1.350) (1.394) (1.324) 
N 731 731 731  731 731 731 
R-squared: within 0.13 0.06 0.26  0.13 0.06 0.26 
R-squared: between 0.67 0.65 0.70  0.67 0.65 0.70 
R-squared: overall 0.64 0.61 0.66  0.64 0.61 0.66 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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 Table 4 Determinants of PNPM Mandiri-Urban Block Grants 
  Model 1    Model 2  
Variables (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
GDRP -0.18592** -0.23286*** -0.11462  -0.17183** -0.21831** -0.10830 
 (0.084) (0.086) (0.084)  (0.083) (0.085) (0.084) 
unemployment 0.03727*** 0.02709** 0.07026***  0.03719*** 0.02699** 0.07049*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.016)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) 
poverty 0.02372** 0.01829* 0.02772**  0.03131*** 0.02609** 0.03021*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
years of schooling 0.17240*** 0.16919*** 0.21967***  0.20676*** 0.20435*** 0.22841*** 
 (0.054) (0.052) (0.066)  (0.054) (0.052) (0.066) 
literacy 0.01528 0.01387 0.00132  0.02200* 0.02083 0.00406 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
births assisted by medical staff -0.00094 -0.00141 0.00283  0.00117 0.00072 0.00375 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
morbidity 0.02030*** 0.01740*** 0.01975**  0.02113*** 0.01821*** 0.02014** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
access to adequate sanitation 0.00319 0.00386 -0.00054  0.00135 0.00202 -0.00127 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
access to electricity 0.01172** 0.01165** 0.01238***  0.01230** 0.01225** 0.01255*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
population -1.03583*** -0.96925*** -1.38206***  -0.98218*** -0.91482*** -1.35809*** 
 (0.153) (0.148) (0.162)  (0.148) (0.142) (0.156) 
vote for SBY 0.01189*** 0.01230*** 0.00484     
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)     
swing     0.00532 0.00552 0.00371 
     (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
constant 11.12242*** 11.59525*** 11.18754***  10.08455*** 10.53316*** 10.77069*** 
 (1.778) (1.762) (1.895)  (1.869) (1.851) (1.921) 
N 509 509 494  509 509 494 
R-squared: within 0.07 0.06 0.07  0.07 0.05 0.07 
R-squared: between 0.47 0.45 0.50  0.45 0.43 0.50 
R-squared: overall 0.43 0.41 0.44  0.41 0.39 0.44 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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 Table 5 Determinants of PNPM Mandiri-RIS Block Grants 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Variables (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
GDRP -0.08553 -0.08553  -0.04651 -0.04651 
 (0.284) (0.284)  (0.230) (0.230) 
unemployment 0.01964 0.01964  0.02221 0.02221 
 (0.038) (0.038)  (0.038) (0.038) 
poverty -0.02163 -0.02163  -0.02861 -0.02861 
 (0.036) (0.036)  (0.035) (0.035) 
years of schooling -0.46978 -0.46978  -0.43890 -0.43890 
 (0.415) (0.415)  (0.350) (0.350) 
literacy 0.16626** 0.16626**  0.14563** 0.14563** 
 (0.073) (0.073)  (0.065) (0.065) 
births assisted by medical staff 0.00519 0.00519  0.00182 0.00182 
 (0.009) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009) 
morbidity 0.02358 0.02358  0.02185 0.02185 
 (0.018) (0.018)  (0.018) (0.018) 
access to adequate sanitation -0.00151 -0.00151  -0.00198 -0.00198 
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) 
access to electricity 0.00637 0.00637  0.00559 0.00559 
 (0.012) (0.012)  (0.011) (0.011) 
population -1.43405*** -1.43405***  -1.39793*** -1.39793*** 
 (0.462) (0.462)  (0.485) (0.485) 
vote for SBY 0.00414 0.00414    
 (0.012) (0.012)    
swing    0.01853 0.01853 
    (0.014) (0.014) 
constant 4.75710 4.75710  6.14225 6.14225 
 (8.291) (8.291)  (6.473) (6.473) 
N 64 64  64 64 
R-squared: within 0.08 0.08  0.09 0.09 
R-squared: between 0.41 0.41  0.42 0.42 
R-squared: overall 0.39 0.39  0.40 0.40 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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 Table 6 Determinants of PNPM Mandiri-RISE Block Grants 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Variables (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
GDRP -0.37918*** -0.37918***  -0.38661*** -0.38661*** 
 (0.068) (0.068)  (0.068) (0.068) 
unemployment 0.00219 0.00219  0.00233 0.00233 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) 
poverty 0.01940*** 0.01940***  0.01976*** 0.01976*** 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) 
years of schooling -0.09440 -0.09440  -0.09487* -0.09487* 
 (0.058) (0.058)  (0.057) (0.057) 
literacy -0.00155 -0.00155  -0.00270 -0.00270 
 (0.014) (0.014)  (0.013) (0.013) 
births assisted by medical staff 0.00001 0.00001  0.00006 0.00006 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
morbidity 0.00225 0.00225  0.00219 0.00219 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
access to adequate sanitation 0.00159 0.00159  0.00158 0.00158 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
access to electricity 0.00006 0.00006  0.00018 0.00018 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) 
population -2.22895*** -2.22895***  -2.20976*** -2.20976*** 
 (0.472) (0.472)  (0.550) (0.550) 
vote for SBY 0.00136 0.00136    
 (0.006) (0.006)    
swing    -0.00297 -0.00297 
    (0.010) (0.010) 
constant 28.11264*** 28.11264***  28.32911*** 28.32911*** 
 (2.912) (2.912)  (3.224) (3.224) 
N 64 64  64 64 
R-squared: within 0.86 0.86  0.86 0.86 
R-squared: between 0.38 0.38  0.39 0.39 
R-squared: overall 0.38 0.38  0.39 0.39 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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 Figure 1 The distribution of the core voter variable 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 The distribution of the swing voter variable 
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